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Executive Summary 
  Safety at highway-rail grade crossings (HRGC) is a major concern for different agencies 
because increasing highway and rail traffic presents a greater risk of crashes at these locations. In 
2008, there were 2,391 crashes and 523 fatalities reported at grade crossings across the U.S. Of 
these, 187 crashes were reported in Nebraska, including 35 involving trucks with trailers and 10 
involving trucks only. At gated crossings, gate-related violations by truck drivers are a primary 
cause of collisions between trains and trucks. The objectives of this research were to report on the 
frequency and type of gate violations by truck drivers at dual quadrant gated HRGCs in Nebraska, 
and to empirically identify factors that may be associated with those gate violations. Data on gate 
violations by truck drivers during train crossing events were collected at two HRGCs in Nebraska. 
Analysis of the data showed that the most frequent violations by truck drivers were passing under 
ascending gates, followed by drivers passing under descending gates. Violations increased with 
greater truck traffic at the HRGCs and with longer times between the onset of flashing lights and 
train arrivals. Analysis also showed nighttime to be associated with a greater frequency of gate 
violations by truck drivers. The main recommendation for reducing gate violations is to reduce 
excessively long time intervals between the onset of flashing lights and train arrivals at HRGCs. 
Recommendations for future research are provided in the report. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
According to year 2008 statistics from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), there 
are 222,178 highway-rail grade crossings (HRGC) across the U.S. Grade-separated crossings 
mitigate the conflict between highways and railroads, but they are expensive to construct and 
sometimes face opposition from local communities due to negative impacts on businesses. Safety 
at HRGCs is a concern of different transportation agencies, as the increasing highway and rail 
traffic presents greater risks of crashes at these locations. In 2004, the Secretary of 
Transportation’s Action Plan for Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety was issued by the US DOT. 
The objectives of this plan were to elevate the importance of highway-rail crossing safety and of 
adopting uniform measures to deal with the safety issue. During 2008, 2,391 crashes and 523 
fatalities were reported at grade crossings across the U.S. by the Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS). Of these, 187 crashes were reported in Nebraska, including thirty-five involving 
trucks with trailers and ten involving single unit (SU) trucks. Therefore, about 24% of the total 
reported crashes at rail crossings in Nebraska involved trucks.  
According to Veli-Pekka et al. (2002), the passing time for a trailer tuck at rail crossings is 
about four times greater than the passing time of an automobile at the same location. Davery et al. 
(2008) reported that the danger posed by heavy vehicles at rail crossings was related to factors 
associated with their physically larger size and heavier mass, as well as the behavior of motor 
vehicle drivers. In addition, trucks and railroads frequently carry hazardous materials. Therefore, 
the implications of a truck-involved crash at an HRGC are more ominous. Since significant 
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economic losses and societal impacts may result from truck-involved crashes at HRGCs, and 
given that rail and truck traffic in the U.S. is expected to grow, it is prudent to investigate factors 
that contribute to truck-involved crashes at HRGCs. The ultimate goal is to improve HRGC safety. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Knowledge of the frequency and type of gate violations by truck drivers at HRGCs, and the 
factors associated with these violations, is needed to better understand factors that contribute to 
truck-involved crashes at HRGCs and subsequently implement appropriate safety 
countermeasures. Unsafe maneuvers by truck drivers in the vicinity of HRGCs with approaching 
trains are a primary underlying cause of collisions between trains and trucks. Although not all gate 
violations by truck drivers result in crashes, the frequency of such maneuvers at crossings is an 
indication of crossing safety. Council et al. (1980) showed that gate violations are an appropriate 
surrogate measure of crashes. Several studies on unsafe driver behavior at HRGCs have been 
reported in the literature (reviewed in chapter 2 of the current study), but no published studies on 
the frequency and type of gate violations by truck drivers at HRGCs were uncovered in the current 
research. Therefore, there is a need to investigate gate violations at HRGCs by truck drivers. 
1.2 Research Objectives and Hypotheses 
The objectives of this research were to report on the frequency and type of gate violations 
by truck drivers at dual quadrant gated HRGCs located in Nebraska, and to empirically identify 
factors that may be statistically significantly associated with those gate violations. Data were 
collected at two HRGCs to assess different types of gate violations by truck drivers and counts of 
3 
those gate violations. An appropriate statistical model was used to investigate relationships 
between gate violations and different independent variables. Specifically, the hypotheses listed in 
table 1.1 were statistically tested for validation. 
 
Table 1.1 Research hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Description 
1 The frequency of gate violations by truck drivers at dual quadrant gated HRGCs 
increases with greater truck traffic during train crossings at the HRGC. 
2 The frequency of gate violations by truck drivers increases with longer times 
between onset of flashing lights and actual train arrivals at crossings. 
3 Greater number of gate violations by truck drivers occurs during nighttime 
compared to other times. 
4 The frequency of gate violations at dual quadrant gated HRGCs by truck drivers 
decreases in rain. 
5 The frequency of gate violations at dual quadrant gated HRGCs by truck drivers 
increases with longer total duration of gate closure.  
6 The frequency of gate violations by trucks is greater on weekends compared to 
weekdays. 
 
 
1.3 Research Approach  
The two study sites utilized in this research were dual quadrant HRGCs in Nebraska. The 
frequency of gate violations by truck drivers and other factors that may be associated with such 
maneuvers were observed at these two locations. Other researchers have adopted a similar 
methodology; for example, Abraham et al. (1998) identified several factors associated with 
driving violations in evaluating HRGCs in Michigan. The data collection method for the current 
study is described in the research program section of this report.  
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The main variable of interest in this research was the count of gate violations by truck 
drivers at gated HRGCs during train crossing events. Table 2 provides a list of variables that were 
deemed to be possibly associated with truck drivers’ propensity for gate violations. An attempt 
was made in this research to collect data on as many factors listed in Table 2 as possible, subject to 
time and budget constraints. 
 
Table 1.2 Variables possibly associated with truck drivers’ propensity for gate violations in 
proximity of HRGCs 
Category Variable 
Traffic control at 
HRGC 
Type of traffic signing at crossing, pavement markings, advance 
train warning time, Time between start of flashing lights and train 
arrival 
Roadway 
characteristics 
 
Average daily traffic, motor vehicle queue at HRGC when train 
has passed, pavement type, angle of intersection  
Truck characteristics Number of trucks at crossings, type of truck, weight of truck, trailer 
length, onboard load  
Rail characteristics Number of trains at the crossing, train length, train speed, train 
stoppage, train backup 
Temporal 
characteristics 
 
Time of day (peak hour or off peak time),day of week (weekday or 
weekend), duration of gate closure 
Environmental 
characteristics 
 
Weather conditions, light conditions, time of day, land use around 
the HRGC 
 
 
A digital video recorder (DVR) continuously recorded video footage at the two HRGCs 
from which train crossing events were extracted. Clips of train crossing videos were visually 
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reviewed and information on gate violations by truck drivers, along with other pertinent data, were 
extracted and populated in a spreadsheet. Data analysis consisted of initially examining descriptive 
statistics for the collected variables, followed by statistical hypothesis testing.  
1.4 Research Assumptions 
This research assumed that different types of gate violations by truck drivers at HRGCs 
were indicative of truck-train HRGC safety. This assumption is supported by the fact that the vast 
majority of crashes at HRGCs are the result of errors by motor vehicle drivers. Another 
assumption in this research was that there were no changes in factors that were not collected in this 
study that may impact truck drivers’ behavior. For example, the intensity of traffic law 
enforcement at the study site was assumed to remain constant for the duration of the study.  
1.5 Report Organization 
The current chapter is followed by a description of the published literature in chapter 2. 
Development of a truck-train safety interaction scheme and data collection at the study site are 
described in chapter 3. Analyses performed on the collected data are presented in chapter 4. 
Research conclusions are presented in chapter 5 while a reference list completes this report. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This literature review covers traffic safety at HRGCs, unsafe driver actions at HRGCs, and 
categorization of gate violations at HRGCs. It also covers statistical modeling when the variable of 
interest is a count of events (e.g., number of gate violations at an HRGC by truck drivers). A 
summary of the literature review appears at the end of this chapter. 
2.1 Traffic Safety at HRGCs 
Transport of freight via rail and trucks has increased, and will likely keep increasing in the 
future. As a result, more and more trucks will negotiate HRGCs, thereby increasing the chances of 
truck-train crashes. Multiple publications report on safety systems at rail crossings. Shinar and Raz 
(1982) studied three different crossing protection systems and found that vehicle speeds reduced 
significantly when the lights were switched on and the gates were coming down, but reduced only 
slightly when the lights were switched off and the gates were raised. Gordon et al. (1984) 
recommended that a perception-reaction time of 3.5 seconds, which is one second longer than the 
standard 2.5 seconds. Hauer and Persaud (1987) showed that the safety of a rail-highway crossing 
could be estimated by factors such as train and traffic flows, types of warning measures, geometry, 
and the accident history of sites. Meeker and Barr (1989) observed that two-thirds of 57 drivers 
crossed the crossing in front of oncoming trains and only four drivers slowed or stopped; they 
concluded that drivers made their decision to cross based on their perception of the distance of 
trains and the time needed to cross.  
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 Publications were reviewed that involved driver characteristics that are prominent factors 
in HRGC safety. For example, Klein et al. (1994) investigated factors involved in rail crossing 
fatalities by analyzing FARS data from 1975 to 1992. They reported that frequency of fatal crashes 
at rail crossings was positively related to: roads with posted speed limits of 55 mph; rural areas; 
Midwestern states; mostly passenger cars; male drivers; Caucasian drivers between ages of 25 and 
34; alcohol involvement; and drivers with relatively less education. Jutaek et al. (2006) examined 
factors associated with rail crossing crashes. They reported that crash rates increased with greater 
total traffic volume and average daily train volumes. Davey et al. (2008) reported that risky driving 
behaviors were mainly caused by misjudgment, drivers trying to save time, higher levels of 
crossing familiarity, poor sight distances, and inadequate warnings.  
2.2 Unsafe Driver Actions at HRGCs 
 Most crashes at HRGCs are the result of a combination of factors including drivers’ failed 
judgments, HRGC geometric characteristics, traffic control characteristics, and environmental 
factors. However, gate violations by motor vehicle drivers at HRGCs are also major contributing 
factors. A study by Sabey and Taylor (1980) showed that human factors contributed to about 95% 
of all crashes, either singularly or in combination with other factors. Human factors, in 
combination with roadway and environmental factors, contributed to 28% of all reported crashes.  
 Leibowitz (1985) showed that inaccurate judgments of train size and speed by motor 
vehicle drivers frequently made drivers cross hazardously. Tenkink and Van der Horst (1990) 
observed driver behavior at two Dutch rail crossings with automatic flashing warning lights. The 
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authors reported overall good compliance by drivers; however, some drivers were noted for 
proceeding immediately after the passage of a train instead of waiting for the end of 
flashing/warning signs.  
 A study by Meeker et al. (1997) showed that 67% of drivers crossed rail crossings with 
flashing lights and bells in front of approaching trains, and 38% of drivers still violated after gates 
were installed. Most of the drivers who violated did not stop or slow down when the crossing was 
equipped with gates. The hypothesis of the researchers was that drivers felt it was safer to violate 
the gate without stopping or slowing. Abraham et al. (1998) found that drivers’ behavior was 
relative to their perception of warning signs; decision making; vehicle control; and risk-taking. 
Longer warning times led to an increase in unsafe crossing behavior. Davey et al. (2008) reported 
that a common perception of train drivers was that truck drivers often deliberately increased their 
speed at HRGCs to “beat the oncoming train.” The explanation by truck drivers for this willful risk 
taking was avoiding delays caused by waiting for trains.  
 Yeh and Multer (2008) provide a comprehensive review of research that addresses driver 
behavior at grade crossings, in order to better understand the decisions and actions made by drivers 
so that countermeasure could be developed to discourage dangerous driving behavior at HRGCs. 
The document updated an earlier report by Lerner et al. (1990). 
2.3 Categorization of Unsafe Maneuvers  
 Fitzpatrick et al. (1997) classified driver violations into three categories according to time 
of violation occurrence. Flashing light (FL) violations occurred in a time period from the onset of 
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flashing lights to two seconds after the gate arms began to go down. Typically enforced violations 
(TEV) were in the period beginning two seconds after the gates started going down (the end of FL 
period) until train arrival at the crossing. The third category of violations, after train (AT), was 
recorded after the train departure until the end of flashing lights. Goodell-Grivas (2000) classified 
violations at HRGCs before the arrival of trains as more risky in comparison to violations 
occurring after train departure. Hellman et al. (2001) used two categories for four-quadrant gated 
HRGCs. The first consisted of violations characterized by passing through the crossing after 
activation of the signal but before the gates were fully lowered. The second consisted of violations 
that occurred after the gates were lowered but before train arrival. Finally, Khattak (2007, 2008, 
2009) considered several categories of maneuvers at HRGCs, including passing around lowered 
gates or gates in motion, making U-turns when gates were fully lowered, and vehicles backing up 
from the crossing.  
2.4 Statistical Models for Count Data 
 Traditional linear regression models are not suitable for investigating relationships 
between dependent variables representing counts of events and other independent variables, since 
one of the requirements is that the dependent variable be continuous. The Poisson model and its 
variants, e.g., the negative binomial and the gamma models, are frequently used to model a count 
variable (Joshua and Garber 1990; Miaou and Lum 1993; Mitra et al. 2002; Geedipally and Lord 
2008). The Poisson distribution requires that the mean and variance of a count variable be equal; 
frequently the variance of a count variable is greater than its mean. Observational data, such as the 
10 
number of traffic crashes in a year, frequently exhibit this property, which is termed 
overdispersion. Under such circumstances the negative binomial model is used, which relaxes the 
requirement that a mean and variance of a count variable be equal. The negative binomial model is 
based on the Poisson model, except that it has an additional parameter alpha (α), called the 
overdispersion parameter, that is used to decide which model (Poisson versus negative binomial) 
is more suitable. Statistical significance of the estimated alpha parameter in a negative binomial 
model shows the appropriateness of the negative binomial compared to the Poisson model. 
Washington et al. (2003) and Miaou (1994) have illustrated the use of negative binomial models in 
the highway safety context. A gamma model is suitable when the variance of a count variable is less 
than its mean, i.e., the data are underdispersed (Greene 2007). 
 Other variations of the Poisson model are the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) and the 
zero-inflated negative binomial models (ZINP). These models are useful for count variables that 
contain more zeros than expected under a Poisson or negative binomial distribution. These models 
may sometimes offer improved statistical fit and better predictive performance compared to 
traditional Poisson and NB models (Shankar et al. 1997). 
2.5 Summary of Literature Review 
 In brief, a number of researchers have focused on different aspects of HRGCs safety and 
classified gate violations in different ways. A review of modeling techniques revealed the 
appropriateness of the Poisson models for count data with several variations, including the 
negative binomial, gamma, zero-inflated Poisson, and the zero-inflated negative binomial models. 
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However, the review did not reveal any published documents specifically dealing with truck 
drivers’ gate related violations at HRGCs. 
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Chapter 3 Data Collection 
 Data collection consisted of focusing on different types of gate violations by truck drivers 
at two HRGCs located in Nebraska. The following four gate violations were taken into account.  
1. Trucks crossing the HRGC with gates descending. 
2. Trucks crossing with HRGC gates fully lowered. 
3. Trucks crossing between successive trains with fully lowered gates. 
4. Trucks crossing while the gates were ascending.  
  Trucks included in this research were SU trucks and trucks with trailer units (semis). 
Interaction between trucks and trains constituted an observation, along with a list of associated 
factors that were extracted from recorded video. A spreadsheet including a coding scheme was 
developed, which was populated with the collected data. 
3.1 Study Sites and Field Data Collection 
 The data were collected at the N141
st
 St. grade crossing in Waverly and the M-St. 
crossing in Fremont, both located in Nebraska. The Waverly HRGC (US DOT crossing no. 
074940T) comprised of four sets of rail tracks crossing two lanes of roadway and protected by 
dual-quadrant gates, while the Fremont crossing (US DOT crossing 074662E) consisted of two 
sets of tracks crossing two lanes of a roadway and protected by dual quadrant gates. Both crossings 
were equipped with flashing lights, crossbuck signs, and audible bells. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show 
the two study sites. 
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Figure 3.1 HRGC at N 141
st
 street in Waverly, NE (source: Google, Inc.) 
14 
 
Figure 3.2 HRGC at M St. crossing in Fremont, NE (source: Google, Inc.) 
 
  A noticeable aspect of the Waverly HRGC was the short distance between the highway 
traffic signal (on Highway 6 and 141
st
 St.) and the rail crossing. Additionally, a grain elevator in 
close proximity to the crossing attracted a considerable number of trucks. Day- and night-vision 
cameras and DVR were installed at both locations to record train crossings. The camera at 
Waverly was installed on top of a fire station located in the southeast corner of the crossing to 
capture video footage of train crossings; the camera in Fremont was installed on a utility pole. 
15 
Video was recorded during the month of November, 2008, and was later observed in the office. 
Instances of train crossings with trucks present at the crossing were extracted from the video 
footage. These video clips were then used for pertinent data extraction and population in a 
spreadsheet.  
 A total of 29 variables representing traffic control characteristics, roadway 
characteristics, temporal characteristics, and environmental characteristics of the HRGC were 
recorded for each observation. Table 3.1 presents a complete list of those variables and their 
respective coding.  
Table 3.1 Variables and coding scheme 
VARIABLE LABEL CODING/UNITS 
S_NO Serial number  
DATE Date of observation  
DAY Day of week Mon=1, Tue=2, ....., Sun=7 
G_DOWN Gate down time from start to end of 
flashing lights 
Seconds 
T_ARRIVAL Time between light flashing and train 
arrival 
Seconds 
TRAINS Number of crossing trains  
SIMULTANEO
US 
Dummy for simultaneous train 
crossings 
1 if simultaneous, 0 otherwise 
STOP Dummy for train stopped at crossing 1 if stopped, 0 otherwise 
CLEAR Dummy for clear weather 1 if clear, 0 otherwise 
RAIN Dummy for rain 1 if raining, 0 otherwise 
WET Dummy for wet pavement 1 if pavement is wet, 0 otherwise 
SNOW Dummy for snow 1 if snowing, 0 otherwise 
SNOW_PVT Dummy for snow on pavement 1 if snow on pavement, 0 otherwise 
FOG Dummy for fog 1 if fog, 0 otherwise 
DAYTIME Light condition 0 if nighttime, 1 if daytime, 2 if dawn 
or dusk, 3 if dark or cloudy, 4 if other 
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Table 3.1 (cont’d.) Variables and coding scheme  
N_SU_TRUCK
S 
Total number of SU trucks observed 
(includes queue+unsafe maneuvers) 
Integer 
N_SEMIS Total number of semis observed 
(includes queue+unsafe maneuvers) 
Integer 
SU_GR1 Number of SU trucks crossing with 
descending gates  
Integer 
SU_GR2 Number of SU trucks crossing with 
gates fully lowered 
Integer 
SU_GR3 Number of SU trucks crossing with 
gates ascending 
Integer 
SU_GR4 Number of SU trucks crossing 
between successive trains 
Integer 
SEMI_GR1 Number of semis crossing with gates 
descending 
Integer 
SEMI_GR2 Number of semis crossing with gates 
fully lowered 
Integer 
SEMI_GR3 Number of semis crossing with gates 
ascending 
Integer 
SEMI_GR4 Number of semis crossing between 
successive trains 
Integer 
SU_UTURN Number of SU trucks making U-turns Integer 
SU_B_UP Numbers of SU trucks backing up Integer 
SEMI_UTURN Number of semis making U-turns Integer 
SEMI_B_UP Numbers of semis backing up Integer 
 
 An example of data extraction is aided by figures 3.3 and 3.4, and table 3.2. In figure 3.3, 
time and date information for the observation is displayed at the bottom-left of the screen. Using 
the controls visible to the right of the screen, the video clip was played and observed for gate 
violations by trucks. Weather conditions from the video clip were observed by data collectors. 
Figure 3.4 shows the onset of a gate activation due to an oncoming train. The total time of the train 
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crossing event was calculated by noting the times of flashing light activation and de-activation. 
The time interval between flashing light activation and train arrival at the crossing was calculated 
in a similar manner. Other variables, such as number of trains, stoppage of trains, violations of 
truck drivers, and truck traffic, were observed by data collectors and populated in a spreadsheet 
with pre-defined variables and values (given in table 3.1). Table 3.2 shows a sample of observation 
data populated from the captured video. A total of 476 train crossing observations with trucks were 
collected. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Interface of DVR software 
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Figure 3.4 Onset of HRGC gate activation 
 
Table 3.2 Example of data extraction for a single observation 
S_NO DATE  DAY G_DOWN T_ARRIVAL TRAINS 
51 12/10/2008 1 150 33 1 
SIMULTANEO
US STOP CLEAR RAIN WET SNOW 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
SNOW_PVT FOG DAYTIME 
N_SU_TRUCK
S N_SEMIS SU_GR1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
SU_GR2 SU_GR3 SU_GR4 SEMI_GR1 SEMI_GR2 SEMI_GR3 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
SEMI_GR4 SU_UTURN SU_B_UP SEMI_UTURN SEMI_B_UP  
0 0 0 0 0  
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Chapter 4 Data Analysis 
 Data analysis began with a preliminary and was followed by a more detailed analysis of 
gate violations by truck drivers. The preliminary analysis consisted of calculating frequencies, 
means, and variances for different variables. The preliminary analysis was performed mainly 
using SPSS (version 18); this analysis is subsequently described. 
4.1 Preliminary Data Analysis  
   As previously stated, four different types of gate violations were monitored during data 
collection. These included passing under descending gates, passing around fully lowered gates, 
passing under ascending gates, and passing around fully lowered gates between successive trains. 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of observations with zero, one, or two gate violations. No gate 
violation was observed in 78.2% of the observations, while a single violation was observed in 
21.6% of the observations. Only in a single observation were two trucks involved in gate-related 
violations. Figure 4.2 shows the frequency of different types of observed gate violations; the most 
frequent was passing under ascending gates (19.7%), followed by passing under descending gates 
(1.7%), while 0.6% of the violations involved SU trucks passing around fully lowered gates. No 
trucks were observed passing around gates between successive trains at the two observed HRGCs.  
20 
 
Figure 4.1 Observations with different number of gate violations 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Frequency of different types of gate violations 
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of observations on different days of the week. Most 
(22.3%) of the observations were made on Tuesday, with somewhat equal observations made on 
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Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Fewer observations were collected on Saturday and 
Sunday. Figure 4.4 presents the distribution of observations across different times of the day. The 
majority (69.1%) of observations were collected during daytime, while somewhat equivalent 
observations were collected under dark or cloudy, dawn or dusk, and nighttime conditions, 
respectively.  
  Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the collected data. The average event time was 
363.5 seconds (about 6 minutes). The mean time between the start of flashing lights and train 
arrival at the crossing was 46.1 seconds (provision of 20 seconds as a minimum is mandated). The 
following section presents a more detailed analysis that includes the testing of the hypotheses 
listed in table 1.1. 
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Figure 4.4 Time of day distribution of observations  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the collected data 
Variable Description Missing 
Values 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GR_TOTAL Total truck (su+semi) gate rushes 0 0.221 0.420 0 2 
DAY Day of week, Mon=1,..Sun=7 0 3.517 1.857 1 7 
G_DOWN Gate down time from start to end of 
flashing lights (seconds) 
2 363.568 309.960 43 3019 
T_ARRIVAL Time between light flashing and train 
arrival (seconds) 
3 46.106 40.598 0 859 
TRAINS Number of crossing trains 0 1.143 0.401 0 3 
SIMULTANEOUS Dummy for simultaneous train 
crossings 
0 0.139 0.346 0 1 
STOP Dummy for train stopped at crossings 0 0.193 0.395 0 1 
CLEAR Dummy for clear weather 0 0.893 0.310 0 1 
RAIN Dummy for rain 0 0.032 0.175 0 1 
WET Dummy for wet pavement 0 0.084 0.278 0 1 
SNOW Dummy for snow 0 0.019 0.136 0 1 
SNOW_PVT Dummy for snow pavement 0 0.080 0.271 0 1 
FOG Dummy for fog 0 0.004 0.065 0 1 
48 (10.1%) 
329 (69.1%) 
39 (8.2%) 
60 (12.6%) 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Nighttime Daytime Dawn or dusk Dark or Cloudy
23 
Table 4.1 (cont’d.) Descriptive statistics for the collected data  
DAYTIME Light condition, 
0=nighttime,1=daytime,2=dawn or 
dusk,3=dark or cloudy,4=other 
0 1.233 0.796 0 3 
N_SU_TRUCKS Total number of single unit trucks 
observed (includes queue+unsafe 
maneuvers) 
0 0.708 0.559 0 3 
N_SEMIS Total number of semis observed 
(includes queue+unsafe maneuvers) 
0 0.309 0.485 0 2 
SU_GR1 Number of single unit trucks crossing 
with gates descending 
0 0.008 0.091 0 1 
SU_GR2 Number of single unit trucks crossing 
with gates fully lowered 
0 0.006 0.079 0 1 
SU_GR3 Number of single unit trucks crossing 
with gates ascending 
0 0.147 0.355 0 1 
SU_GR4 Number of single unit trucks crossing 
between successive trains 
0 0.000 0.000 0 0 
SEMI_GR1 Number of semis crossing with gates 
descending  
0 0.008 0.091 0 1 
SEMI_GR2 Number of large semis crossing with 
gates fully lowered 
0 0.000 0.000 0 0 
SEMI_GR3 Number of semis crossing with gates 
ascending 
0 0.050 0.219 0 1 
SEMI_GR4 Number of semis crossing between 
successive trains 
0 0.000 0.000 0 0 
LOCATION Fremont or Waverly 0 1.534 0.499 1 2 
TRUCK QUEUE Number of trucks in queue 0 1.126 0.391 1 4 
WEEKEND Dummy for weekend 0 0.172 0.378 0 1 
DAY Dummy for daytime (daytime=1) 0 0.691 0.462 0 1 
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4.2 Detailed Data Analysis  
 Detailed data analysis involved analyzing the frequency of gate related violations by truck 
drivers and statistically testing the hypotheses listed in table 1.1 The Poisson model or its 
variations were appropriate for use, as the variable of interest consisted of gate violation counts 
during train crossing events. The Poisson model allows the establishment of a relationship 
between a dependent (count) variable and a number of independent variables. For a discrete 
random variable Y, such as number of gate violations, with observed frequencies yi = 1, 2, …,N 
(where yi ≥ 0), the probability that the observed frequencies are the real frequencies is: 
 
             
     
                 (4.1) 
      
            (4.2) 
where, 
    = estimated vector of parameters 
    = vector of gate rush relevant characterizes for observation i, and 
    = mean and the variance of the observed gate rush frequency 
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 The Poisson model requires that the mean and variance of the count variable be the same. 
Many times this requirement is not met, and an alternative model is needed. The negative binomial 
model relaxes this requirement and serves as an alternate model. The resulting probability 
distribution is:  
                             
            (4.3) 
where, 
   = error term, (1, α2). Integrating   out of the above equation produces the unconditional 
  distribution of   . The equation for this distribution is: 
 
                              
       
       (4.4) 
where, 
              probability of the ith gate violation, 
    =         , and  
        
 
 Both the Poisson and the negative binomial models can be estimated by the standard 
maximum-likelihood methods. A measure of the goodness-of-fit for an estimated model is the 
fraction of a restricted log-likelihood: 
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            (4.5) 
where, 
       = log likelihood and     = restricted log likelihood. 
 
 The value of   for an estimated model is between 0 and 1; a greater value of   indicates 
a better fitting model compared to models with lower values of  . A chi square test is used to judge 
the overall usefulness of the model, which measures the sum of the differences between observed 
and expected outcome frequencies; therefore the statistical significance of chi square indicates that 
the model is providing useful information. The equation is: 
 
    ∑
       
 
  
 
              (4.6) 
 
 NLOGIT 4.0 was used for model estimation. Estimated coefficients in the model were 
statistically tested using a student’s t-test to assess if they were different than zero at 95% or 90% 
confidence levels. Absolute t-statistic values of 1.96 or greater and 1.64 or greater indicated 
statistical significance at the 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
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 Table 4.2 shows the estimated model with relevant summary statistics. Overall, the 
estimated model provided useful information even though the overall model fit was not very good. 
A positive estimated coefficient shows that the frequency of gate violations by trucks increased 
with increasing values of the variable, while a negative estimated coefficient indicates that gate 
violations decreased with increasing values of the variable. 
 
Table 4.2 Estimated model for gate violations by trucks at HRGCs 
Variable Description Est. Coeff. Std. 
error 
t-statistic Mean 
N_SU_TRUCK Total number of SU trucks 0.709 0.212 3.345 0.706 
N_SEMIS  Total number of semis 0.586 0.254 2.308 0.309 
T_ARRIVAL Time between lights flashing and 
train arrival (sec) 0.003 0.002 1.989 46.106 
NIGHT    Dummy variable for nighttime 0.477 0.273 1.750 0.101 
RAIN     Dummy variable for rain -1.221 0.958 -1.275 0.032 
Constant Constant in the model -2.424 0.275 -8.808 - 
 
Model summary statistics   
   
 
Number of observations 473 
   
 
Log likelihood -255.821 
   
 
Restricted Log likelihood -263.732 
   
 
Rho-squared 0.030 
   
 
Chi squared 15.822 
   
 
P-value for chi squared 0.007 
   
 
 Two variables indicating the number of SU trucks (N_SU_TRUCKS) and semis 
(N_SEMIS) encountered during train crossing events were included in the model specification to 
test Hypothesis 1 (listed in table 1.1). Together, the variables represent truck exposure to 
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involvement in gate violations. Both variables were statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level, indicating that gate violations increased with greater numbers of SU trucks and semis 
arriving at HRGCs, thus confirming Hypothesis 1. The greater value of the estimated coefficient 
for SU trucks compared to the coefficient for semis showed that SU truck drivers were more prone 
to gate violations, in comparison to drivers of semis.  
  The variable T_ARRIVAL represented the time between the start of flashing lights and 
train arrival at the crossings. This time depends on the speed of approaching trains, and a minimum 
stipulated value of 20 seconds must be provided. The estimated coefficient was positive and 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, showing that longer values of T_ARRIVAL 
were associated with greater gate violations at the HRGCs. This result confirms Hypothesis 2 
listed in Table 1. 
 To test Hypothesis 3, the model specification included a dummy variable for nighttime. 
The estimated coefficient for this variable was positive and statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level (t-statistic >1.64), thus confirming Hypothesis 3. The finding regarding nighttime 
was that it was associated with a greater frequency of gate related violations in comparison to 
daylight, dawn, and dusk, etc. Finally, a dummy variable for rain was included in the model to 
explore its association with the frequency of gate related violations by trucks (i.e., Hypothesis 4). 
The estimated coefficient was negative, indicating that gate violations occurred less frequently 
during conditions of rain; however, the estimate was not statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level, and therefore the collected data did not provide enough evidence to make a 
29 
conclusive statement regarding the effect of rain on gate violations by truck drivers. Hypotheses 5 
(duration of gate closure) and 6 (weekends versus weekdays) were tested and found to not be 
substantiated by the model. These two variables were then removed from the model specification.  
  Other variables available in the database were also tested in the model specification, but 
were found not to be statistically significant. These included: the number of crossing trains, train 
stoppage on the crossing, and a dummy variable for crossing location (Waverly or Fremont). 
These variables were excluded from the model specification for parsimony. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The objectives of this research were to report on the frequency and type of gate violations 
by truck drivers and to empirically identify factors associated with such gate violations. Four types 
of violations were monitored: trucks passing under descending gates, trucks passing around fully 
lowered gates, trucks passing under ascending gates, and trucks passing around fully lowered gates 
between successive trains. Data were collected at two HRGCs and analyzed; no trucks were 
observed passing around gates between successive trains at the two observed HRGCs. Analysis 
indicated that about 20% of the observations involved trucks passing under ascending gates, with 
relatively few trucks passing under descending gates, and even fewer trucks passing around fully 
lowered gates. Results of a Poisson model confirmed the hypotheses that a greater frequency of 
violations was associated with the variables of greater truck traffic at the HRGCs; longer durations 
between the onset of flashing lights and train arrival at the crossing; and nighttime. Based on these 
findings, the following conclusions were reached. 
 Gate related violations at HRGCs by truck drivers mainly included passing under 
descending or ascending gates. 
 Longer times between the onset of flashing lights and train arrivals at HRGCs contributed 
to greater frequencies of gate violations.  
 Nighttime was associated with greater frequencies of gate violations by truck drivers. 
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To improve safety at HRGCs the following recommendations were offered: 
 The time interval between the onset of flashing lights and actual train arrival at HRGCs 
should not be excessively large beyond the minimum 20 seconds required.  
 Countermeasures aimed at reducing gate violations at nighttime should be investigated, 
including driver education and enforcement of motor vehicle laws at HRGCs. 
  Certain aspects of truck safety at HRGCs need further investigation. These include the 
collection and analysis of data on characteristics of drivers involved in gate violations; wider 
geographic and temporal coverage of HRGCs in the analysis; and implementation and assessment 
of countermeasures for reducing gate violations by truck drivers. Moreover, though this research 
did not find statistically significant evidence regarding the effect of rain on gate violations by truck 
drivers, the effects of weather on HRGC safety warrant future study. 
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